Innovations impact societies in a variety of ways. Successful innovations are utility enhancing, in that they create a higher degree of benefits that offset any of the potential disadvantages of the innovation. Unsuccessful innovations suffer from the reverse, in that they result in more disadvantages than benefits and therefore, are ultimately rejected by society. The innovation of agricultural biotechnology and genetically modified (GM) crops has triggered substantial discussion regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the technology. Numerous financial and economic benefits are starting to be recognized by adopters, but some non-adopters are growing increasingly concerned about their ability to profit given the high levels of GM crop adoption. While some might argue that non-adopters of GM crops are the conventional economic losers of this innovation, the reality is that demand for non-GM products is higher, in large part, because of consumer desires to avoid GM food products. The concept of pure economic loss in relation to innovation posits that those negatively impacted by the innovation of GM crops are entitled to compensation that offsets the externality. In undertaking a thorough assessment of pure economic loss and GM crops, this article evaluates the logic for, and efficiencies of, having compensation funded via the use of courts versus government regulations. This article considers whether nonadopter rights are developing in the case of GM crops and what governance response mechanism is best suited to those claims. It is concluded that the decision over whether to support or reject an innovation is too important to the larger society as a whole to be decided by the courts.
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Innovation presents governments and society with a quandary. Supporting innovative research is seen as a beneficial investment governments can make for society as a whole. In fact, numerous international agencies collect data and report on how much investment, as a percentage of gross domestic product, is made in research and development by governments around the world. When innovative research results, however, in a transformative technological advancement, such as in Part I by considering the attitude of the courts in those jurisdictions to such claims. It does this by examining the common law liability in negligence for both GM adopting farmers that plant and harvest GM crops (GM adopters) and those creating and distributing GM seeds (GM developers) toward non-GM farmers. The potential liability of regulators and the liability of GM adopters and developers to each other are not considered. Although the issues of breach of duty and causation of harm raise particularly difficult problems in claims of negligently caused pure economic loss, this article considers only whether a duty of care will be owed. 15 This focus has been chosen because the legal concerns taken into account by courts in the duty analysis can be expected to reflect the jurisdiction's concerns and values in the context of innovation. As Stapleton writes in relation to pure economic loss cases in, amongst others, Australian and Canadian courts: "[C]ourts now tend
to use an open-textured analysis of all the substantive legal concerns weighing for and against recognition of a duty, be they moral, economic, or other types of concerns relevant to the incidence of tort liability."16
As explained below, whether a duty is owed depends in part on "a value judgment based on the judiciary's view of community expectations as to the appropriate range of protection to be afforded in respect of the growing of crops."17 It is those "values" or normative judicial concerns and how they will play out in scenarios involving non-adopters' claims in the three different countries that is of interest in this paper.
Part II of the article then examines the state response to non-adopters' rights. This will be particularly important during the usual time lag between the commercialization of an innovation and the availability of insurance for harm caused by that innovation. The economic rationale for having the state compensate non-adopters for economic loss incurred as a result of widespread adoption of GM crop technology is also considered. The authors argue that governments are not efficient allocators of compensation. It is not intended to argue that the courts of these jurisdictions use economic theory to reach their decisions.18
Finally, the authors will try to draw conclusions about the adequacy of responses of courts and regulators.19 It will be concluded that because responses by the courts and regulators to nonadopters' claims are unsatisfactory in some aspects, action by governments at the international level may improve the situation but not solve the quandary altogether.
I. ECONOMIC LOSS AND THE COURTS A. Negligence Causing Pure Economic Loss
The relationship between tort law and new economic interests is an uneasy one. As noted by two
Canadian commentators:
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. . . as new markets are created, new technologies developed, and new conflicts of competing economic interests occur, the courts have had to create new causes of action, to modify or even stifle old ones. In each case the judge or judges concerned bring their experience and judicial values to bear on the "socially proper" outcome to adopt. In each case the courts regulate market behaviour, utilizing doctrinal devices such as "unreasonableness" in negligence . . .20
The law of negligence in all three jurisdictions was originally derived from the United Kingdom.
However, differences in the development of the law, in particular the treatment of recovery for pure economic loss caused by negligence, gives rise to differences in the precise legal rules.21
These arguably reflect, to some extent, different societal values in the jurisdictions. A major difficulty for innovative products such as GMOs is predicting whether their use will be regarded as falling below societal standards and whether the claims of harm they cause will be considered actionable by courts. This perhaps reflects the relevant society's predisposition to innovation more generally. At the least, it sends a message to future innovators on possible obstacles to commercialization.
In each of Canada, Australia, and the United States, establishing a duty of care in respect to pure economic loss requires that damage to the plaintiffbe reasonably foreseeable. However, because of concerns about the effect of liability in such cases, something more is required. vulnerability of the plaintiffand reliance by the plaintiffand the undertaking of responsibility by the defendant; and the existing statutory regime and common law regulating the relevant act.37
A significant difficulty in predicting the outcome of any particular proceeding is that the decision about what factors are important in any particular case is subjective.38 Nevertheless, the factors described above include those factors used by U.S. courts to justify the imposition of or departure from the economic loss doctrine as well as those factors assessed by the Canadian courts in their three part test. These factors will therefore be considered in more detail below in the context of GM crops following a brief description of relevant case law in each jurisdiction. The arguments for and against each factor being used will be canvassed and conclusions then drawn together in the final section of this part. Whether the predicted findings are economically sensible is considered in the final part of this article, after consideration of regulatory alternatives to reliance on the common law to address non-adopters' rights. In all three jurisdictions the avoidance of indeterminate liability is a primary concern in pure economic loss cases.81 It is this concern that makes it unlikely a duty would be found in the United States. Liability is indeterminate when the likely number of claims and the nature of them cannot be realistically calculated.82 In Australia at least, for liability to be determinate the defendants need not know of individual persons; liability can be determinate when at the time of the negligence the tortfeasor could have ascertained the identity of the specific class of persons likely to be affected. 83 This also seems to be the case in Canada. 84 Stapleton has explained that the courts in both jurisdictions are seeking boundaries based on normatively justifiable arguments.
In the case of GMOs, GM adopters and developers would or should be aware of the existence of particular markets for non-GMOs and GM developers would or should be aware of regulatory obligations imposed on those growing GMOs. In the words of the Sauer court, there is perhaps an economic and, at least in Australia, where the production of GM crops after approval is regulated, a regulatory link between GM adopters-developers and non-adopters. Further, the number of nonadopters who may be affected is arguably finite and ascertainable (although possibly large).86
Indeterminacy in respect to those who have directly and primarily suffered harm should therefore not be a basis on which a court refuses to find a duty of care.87
Indeterminacy will mean, however, that no duty of care is likely to be owed to second line or ripple effect victims in all three jurisdictions.88 Such victims would, for example, be persons who handle the produce of nonadopters. 89 As a general rule, those who suffer loss as a consequence of the primary or first line victim suffering loss (that is, the person who has directly suffered harm) are not owed any duty of care to avoid pure economic loss.90
Similarly, second line victims would be an unascertainable class in the case of GMO releases because it would be impossible to say how many are likely to be in the class. GM adoptersdevelopers could not realistically calculate the numbers affected or, if required, the quantum of claims as at the time of the release.
Regulations put in place by state or national governments may have a significant role to play in determining whether indeterminacy is a relevant concern in Australia and Canada.91 For example, in a case concerning the contamination of cattle by an insecticide used in growing cotton after cattle grazed on cotton stubble, the Australian Federal Court refused to recognize a duty of care to, amongst others, exporters who lost business or profit because of the effect of controls introduced by foreign governments.92 In Perre, the economic loss flowed from state regulations but it was not where the line regarding indeterminacy was drawn-some who suffered loss because of the regulation were allowed to recover, others were not. Therefore, in the case of GM crops the line may not be drawn on the basis of whether the crop is legally approved in the particular country or not.
Unreasonable Interference with Personal Autonomy, Economic Freedom, and Market

Competition
Reluctance to interfere with personal autonomy, competitive commercial practice, and with the right to legitimately pursue personal gain in business is another primary concern of the courts in all three jurisdictions in pure economic loss claims. These factors point to no duty being owed by GM adopters-developers with respect to pure economic loss where neither the plaintiffnor any other person has suffered property damage because of contamination or comingling. In the Australian Perre decision, the defendantrespondent already owed a duty of care to another person, which required them to not act in the way in which they had acted.96 In contrast, besides the duty under consideration, the GM adopter-developer will arguably owe no other duty of care with respect to GMO releases if no property damage has been or will be caused to nonadopters or other third parties.
Further, imposing a duty of care on GM adopters-developers when lawfully releasing GMOs to avoid causing pure economic loss to non-adopters is arguably inconsistent with the legitimate pursuit by the GM adopter-developer of financial gain.97 GM adopters-developers, like non-GM farmers, have a commercial interest in crop production. The non-adopter and GM farmer in some cases may be in economic competition with each other. For example, they may both grow canola intended for a particular overseas market. Therefore, imposing a duty could hinder competition.
Finally, it could be submitted that the non-adopter, by voluntarily adopting a form of agriculture susceptible to adverse consequences if GMOs are released, should not be able to force GM adopters-developers to cease doing something they otherwise could. 
Control by Defendant
That the defendant has control over the enjoyment of a legal right by another, not necessarily the plaintiff, is a factor in favour of a duty with respect to pure economic loss.103 Non-adopters may argue they have a legal right to pursue any lawful activity on their land, including GM-free agriculture with no extra costs incurred because of the actions of others and to pursue a premium for being non-GM. The enjoyment of that "right" is in part affected by the GM adopter-developers because their actions determine whether GM-free agriculture remains possible. For example, the non-adopter may be unable to export their produce as a pure non-GM product because of rules of international trade regarding GMO content; they may have to label their produce sold domestically in a particular way because of food or consumer-protection legislation; or may lose their crop premium because of the rules of the relevant organic certification scheme. GM adopters and developers could respond that some (but not all) of the consequences suffered by the nonadopters are outside the control of adopters and developers.
That many of the consequences suffered by the non-adopter are outside the control of the GM adopter-developer, however, is unlikely to mean the GM adopters-developers are not "in control."
It is likely a court would instead consider this all the more reason the GM adopters-developers should ensure that they not do something that puts others at risk of not complying with relevant regulations or requirements.104 GM adopters and developers could also argue that the relevant regulators, rather than themselves, are in control: it is regulations that determine whether the activities proceed. It is true that the relevant regulations determine whether a release can lawfully occur, but it is the GM adopter and developer who decide whether to proceed and whether to take additional precautions. GM adopters-developers are aware of the risk to others and GM developers, at least, often know the magnitude of the risk.105 It is therefore likely that a court would find that the GM adopter-developer is in "control."
Finally, it could be asserted that choice of agricultural method, the costs of that method remaining unaffected, and pursuit of a premium for its products are not protected rights for the purposes of the legal concern of control by the defendant. What is included as a right for these purposes is unclear. Anything that can be lawfully done could theoretically be included. At least two indicators are important in the context of the "vulnerability factor"; these are reliance and assumption of responsibility.111 As Baron explains, reliance in this context means an expectation by the plaintiffthat the defendant will use due care towards them.112 The expectation is said to arise from the fact that the defendant knows that the plaintiffis depending upon them to use such care.113 An assumption of responsibility by the defendant to the plaintiffmeans that the defendant has accepted or is deemed by the law to have accepted by their conduct that the defendant will be liable to the plaintifffor the consequences of that conduct.114 Alternatively, the defendant may assume responsibility by generating in the plaintiffan expectation based on the defendant's conduct that such liability will result.115
This approach puts the onus on the plaintiffto protect its own interests and to take steps to avoid or minimize a possible risk of harm to those interests. 116 The court considers whether the plaintiffwas entitled to rely, and was reasonable in relying, on the defendant. If there were other steps the plaintiffcould and should reasonably have taken to protect their own economic interests then the plaintiffmay not be considered to be vulnerable and a duty of care may not be owed.117
On the other hand, if a GM adopter -developer's behavior is risky or unreasonable they may be considered to have assumed responsibility for the consequences of their conduct and a duty may arise. This factor begins to overlap with that of the defendant's control of the relevant risks. Thus non-adopters could argue that because GM developers choose to release GMOs for commercial gain, and secondly, because they are best able to insure against harm because they have the best knowledge of the possible risks and can offset any costs by passing them onto consumers, they are in control and thus owe a duty to anyone injured by their acts.118
In response, given that the GMO release will have been authorized by the relevant regulators, GM developers may assert that their conduct is not risky or unreasonable. In granting authorization to release the GMO, the regulator must have assessed the science-based risks of harm as objectively manageable and acceptable.119 GM developers could therefore assert that with the regulators having struck a balance between the parties' competing interests, the court should not seek to reopen the matter.120 The regulations, however, do not require consideration of all the harms relevant to a court's assessment of duty. For example, under U.S., Canadian and Australian regulations, the economic harms caused by GMO releases are irrelevant. Therefore, that a GMO release is authorized does not necessarily mean that a court would consider that the balance has been struck in the right place and that therefore GM adoptersdevelopers have not assumed responsibility for economic harm caused to others when releasing GMOs.
With respect to insurance and cost offsetting, the availability of insurance to GM adopters should not be a determining factor. As Stapleton points out it is morally incoherent that an equally culpable but uninsurable actor should escape what an insured actor does not.121 Nor should the victim be denied recompense on this basis.122 Further, it could be expected to be easier to assess risk in a first party insurance scenario (for example, a non-adopter purchases insurance to protect against their own risk of pure economic loss) than a third party insurance scenario (for example, a GM adopter purchases insurance to protect against third party claims of pure economic loss). In economic terms then, the non-adopter is the least cost avoider. GM adopters-developers could also assert that non-adopters are able to protect themselves contractually by charging a premium for the additional costs of avoiding contamination or comingling, something that grain farmers, GM or otherwise, cannot usually do. This is a strong argument against finding a duty of care.
With respect to the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant using due care, Justice McHugh in Perre said that if it was reasonably open to the plaintiffto take steps to protect himself then there is no need for a duty of care.123 The Canadian courts take a similar view.124 In the case of GMOs, non-adopters could take some steps to avoid the risk of economic harm or minimize damage to themselves. For example, non-adopters could produce sexually incompatible crops, change their accepted tolerance level for comingling with GMOs, or not enter into contracts pursuant to which they agree to produce non-GM crops. But even if there are precautions available to non-adopters (which will not always be the case), the crucial issue for the court is whether it is reasonable to require non-adopters to take them. How reasonableness at this stage is to be determined is not clear. Presumably it involves many of the same considerations relevant when assessing both the defendant's fault at the breach-of-duty stage as well as when considering whether the plaintiffhas been contributorily negligent.125 Given those considerations, the likelihood of economic harm, the gravity of any harm and the cost and difficulty of taking precautions will all be important. This will require case by case assessment. It seems likely that a court will decide, on policy, that tort law protection should not be denied to plaintiffs who fail to take all but the most straightforward precautions.126 What steps are reasonably to be taken by the plaintiffvaries in each case, but some guidance can be gleaned from the case law.127
In Perre, the appellants took no steps to protect themselves from the effects of the respondent's negligence.128 However, the appellants were not found to have acted unreasonably.129 Justice
Callinan said that the appellants were entitled to expect that a person such as the respondent would act carefully and responsibly in carrying out an experimental activity that had a real and acknowledged potential to cause grave harm to the appellants. 130 Nonadopters may argue that they also should not be required to take steps to protect themselves. However, in Perre the appellants were unaware of the risk to them posed by the respondent's act.131 They therefore could not be said to have been unreasonable in not taking steps to protect themselves and were instead considered vulnerable by the court. In the Canadian decision Bow Valley, the plaintiffs' failure to allocate the risk to another when it could have was a factor against finding a duty.132 In GMO-release cases, non-adopters would or should be aware of the risk to them posed by the GM adopter's act. Non-adopters will know of the GM developer's activities at least because of the publicity given to the introduction of GM crops. Common knowledge means both non-adopters and GM adopters should be aware of the risk of harm to others following GMO releases, even where regulators' approval is obtained. Non-adopters are therefore not as vulnerable as the parties in
Perre.
GM adopters-developers may assert that insuring against pure economic loss is a reasonable precaution that could be taken by non-adopters. However, as noted above, it is questionable whether the availability of insurance to either party is relevant or a reasonable precaution.133
Justice McHugh in Perre expressly stated that whether the plaintiffis insured is generally irrelevant to the issue of vulnerability.134 In any case, it seems that it will be difficult for either party to insure against such harm.135
What is not clear from the case law is how relevant voluntarily imposed standards of behavior are in cases such as where non-adopters have chosen to refuse to adopt an innovation or contract with third parties in a way that requires others also not to adopt an innovation (such as where organic farmers contract with buyers to provide 100% non-GM grain), which causes the nonadopters their loss. Certainly during the breach and contributory negligence stages, the reasonableness of the plaintiff's behavior is assessed against an objective standard of a "reasonable person" rather than a subjective test of the plaintiff's actual attributes and opinions. Nevertheless, some subjective qualities of the plaintiffare relevant and the crucial concern is whether the choice to be a nonadopter is one that should be taken into account or disregarded as an eccentricity of the plaintiff.
GM adopters-developers would likely not be successful in having the court find non-adopters not vulnerable just because they have voluntarily chosen to be a non-adopter, for the same reason the court is reluctant to unduly interfere with the personal autonomy of the defendant in choosing to adopt an innovation, as discussed above. However, this issue needs further exploration.
Existing Statutory Regime and Common Law
In Perre, Justice McHugh said that "[w]here another body of law effectively deals with the economic loss, a court should be slow to use negligence law to impose a duty of care on a defendant. This is particularly important where to do so would interfere with a coherent body of law in another field."136 As noted above, the effect of recognizing a duty of care on other legal obligations is also relevant in Canadian law.137 That there are regulatory regimes regulating GMO releases is therefore relevant to whether a court should find a duty of care to avoid pure economic loss.138 "The presence of a statutory regime may, as a matter of policy, be a factor militating against the finding of a duty of care. . . ."139 As a general proposition, a court should not find a duty of care to avoid pure economic loss if the duty resting upon the tortfeasor would be inconsistent with a duty imposed by a statutory instrument. 140
GM adopters-developers could make two points here. First, GMOs are the subject of a comprehensive system of international and national regulation and are not prohibited, unlike the situation in Perre,141 Starlink Litigation, and the Canadian Sauer case. This is a factor against finding a duty of care. Secondly, in imposing a duty of care on GM adopters or developers in respect to pure economic loss, the law of negligence would arguably be undermining another body of law, that of the statutory regulation of GMOs. It would be intruding into an already established area of law and government policy, the statutory schemes regulating GMO releases. Finding that a duty of care is owed by GM adopters-developers means both parties would need to, in effect, second guess the decisions of the regulators and not proceed with releases that the government, through those regimes, decides can proceed. In the case of GMOs, it would effectively block innovation.
While it is true that GMO releases are comprehensively regulated, the above arguments are unlikely to succeed. It is likely that finding a duty to take reasonable care when carrying out authorized releases would not be considered unacceptable interference with the regulatory schemes.142 Satisfying such a duty of care would not require conduct contrary to such legislation.
Furthermore, the relevant regulations do not deal with GM developers' liability to others following approved releases. Non-adopters could therefore submit that the government intended the common law of negligence to apply concurrently with the legislation. A court is likely to agree and conclude that finding a duty of care owed by GM developers is not inconsistent with the relevant regulations and does not interfere with any decision making under the statutes. Furthermore, finding such a duty would not effectively block innovation because the existence of a duty does not guarantee that GM developers will be liable. Compliance with relevant regulations will be relevant in the subsequent assessment of liability. Further, it is arguable that what courts are considering here is the narrower effect of whether a defendant will have to comply with two inconsistent lawful obligations, such as an obligation imposed by regulation and one imposed by common law. The broader repercussions for society of the existence of a duty, such as discouraging the introduction of an innovation, seem outside the balancing of private interests undertaken in a negligence claim.
C. Conclusions Regarding Duty
Predicting the outcome of negligence actions brought by non-adopters with respect to pure economic loss caused by GMO releases is difficult, particularly because of the importance of the facts of each case and because of the policy factors relevant in determining whether a duty of care is owed.143 Different courts and commentators may reach different conclusions with respect to policy matters because of "differences in social and economic conditions and in judicial
assessments of community values and the proper role and scope of tort law."144 Nevertheless, the following conclusions are suggested based on the discussion above.
An Australian court is likely to find that a duty of care arises in such cases. It is less certain whether a Canadian court may find a duty of care, although in light of Sauer it is possible.145 It is unlikely that a U.S. court would find a duty of care if only pure economic loss was suffered. 146 The courts in all countries must reconcile two competing interests. The reluctance to unduly interfere with legitimate economic freedom stressed by the Australian High Court in Perre and later cases, the Canadian Supreme Court in Edwards, and U.S. courts through the economic loss doctrine, strongly points to no duty being owed by GM adopters-developers in all jurisdictions. However, nonadopters' economic (and personal) freedom to pursue particular types of agriculture incompatible with GMOs is generally vulnerable to GM adopters'-developers' actions. Therefore in Australia and possibly Canada, unless there is a particular action the non-adopter could take to prevent harm, reconciliation is likely to require a duty be found for two reasons.
First, finding a duty is consistent with an economic analysis of where responsibility should lie. GM adopters, by growing GMOs, are receiving an economic benefit from the activity causing the harm. 147 It is appropriate that they therefore owe a duty when taking such action. Secondly, that GM agriculture is regulated would only seem to suggest that it is all the more appropriate that a duty to take reasonable care be owed. While it is arguable that nonadopters have voluntarily chosen to be vulnerable by choosing to remain GM free (and indeed may seek to profit from doing so) and that imposing a duty on GM adopters-developers creates a new restraint on the legitimate business activities of GM adopters-developers and could in effect be a tax on innovation, community standards with respect to culpability where someone interferes with another's preexisting lawful autonomy and way of life seems to demand a duty be owed.
This outcome may seem legally unwise or economically objectionable to those wanting to introduce agricultural biotechnology. However, (putting to one side that the finding of a duty does not mean that GM adopters-developers will be liable in negligence) this reflects an important limitation on the course open to courts. Of the three countries, none of the courts consider, in the policy analysis relevant to duty of care, the factor of lost opportunity costs and foregone benefits to society, the country, or the world as a whole. The court in negligence proceedings is generally balancing private interests. Although during consideration of the factor of the defendant's economic freedom and market competition generally, it comes close to considering broader issues of the effect on the community generally, it is unclear how broadly these issues are examined by courts. But arguments based on an overall national or international benefit to be gained by allowing GM crops to be farmed without any duty of care with respect to pure economic loss to non-adopters seems outside the calculations of the court. Regulation then would seem to be the way to ensure this broader balancing of risks and benefits to society's interests. This is taken up in the next part.
II. ECONOMIC LOSS AND GOVERNMENT
Innovations impact societies in a myriad of ways. Industrial economies have tended to support the quest for new innovations by rewarding early innovators with patents or monopolies, or both for their technologies. More recently, governments have sustained this quest by providing various federal support mechanisms (for example, grants, tax incentives, infrastructure development, and so forth) for innovative research and development. As an innovation is adopted by the society into which it is commercialized and the technology becomes accepted and valued by the adopters, the negative externalities of the innovation can become apparent.
Insurance is a routine part of agriculture in all three jurisdictions. Agricultural insurance is The challenge with the innovation of GM crops is that no insurance firms have offered insurance against comingling or harms alleged to be caused simply by the growing of GMOs. Insurance firms have been asked to provide insurance, but the response from the insurance industry has been that it is, so far, unable to determine the risk threshold for comingling and therefore, their actuaries cannot determine the price of an insurance premium to charge potential clients.154 At the present time, the insurance industry is unable to provide insurance against negative externalities that result from the production of GM crops.
Normally, regulations are used to manage the safe and efficient use or application of a product or technology where harm of some kind may be caused. In the case of GM crops in Australia, regulatory review and oversight to protect human health and safety and the environment is a States began the cautious approval of GM crop production.158
In terms of commercializing GM crop technologies, Canada and the United States are global leaders. Public concerns simply were not an issue in the early to mid 1990s, when the initial crop varieties were proceeding through the regulatory system. This is not to say that there was no public awareness of the issue, but rather, the social voice was not loud enough to trigger any political involvement. In fact, according to many of the biotech pioneers, the agricultural biotechnology industry asked for more rigorous regulatory requirements than what were offered by federal regulators.159 While regulations were used to ensure the safety of these crop varieties, once they were approved, the capacity to regulate the technology ceased. At this point, the onus of responsibility fell to industry. If those that chose not to adopt the technology felt that they were being adversely affected, it would be the responsibility of their industry to develop a management system or production protocols to protect their production practices.
Direct federal or state-provincial regulation in North America was not an option to address possible economic loss because regulators do not have the mandate to control products in the marketplace that have been approved for commercial use as long as the products are not causing safetyrelated problems. Economic loss is not considered to be a safety issue. Therefore, we turn our attention to other government options.
Negative externalities can be managed and in some cases prevented through the use of taxes. The emission of pollution from factories is a negative externality that has been managed through the application of a tax. Pigou proposed a tax on externalities as a means of limiting or removing the presence of negative externalities in society.160 A Pigovian tax is a fee that is paid by a polluter usually to the government, based on the units of pollution.161 This tax, if implemented at the correct level, is socially efficient as it removes the deadweight loss associated with the tax.162
While on the surface, levying a Pigovian tax on the innovation of GM crops would seem like a remedy to the challenge of lost premiums and additional costs for non-adopters, as one delves deeper into the issue, it is not. For example, in 2010 in Western Canada, 93% of the canola production was genetically modified, herbicide tolerant (GMHT), and a further 6% was mutagenic herbicide tolerant, leaving only 1% of the canola produced in Western Canada as being varieties that are not herbicide tolerant. 163 In the United States, the adoption rate for GM soybeans is 90%, while the rates for cotton and corn range from 70%-80%. 164 In Australia, GM cotton accounts for over 90% total production.165 All of the GM varieties of these crop types have been approved for production by the relevant regulatory agencies, thereby making their classification as pollution in the Pigovian sense a challenge.
This starts to get to the heart of the matter of pure economic loss caused by GM crops by documenting that the "winners" far outnumber the "losers" and raising the question whether society should step in and argue that nonadopter rights are equal to adopter-developer rights, and therefore compensation should be available regardless of how few non-adopters are affected. In the absence of an insurance market, should the state be willing to protect the economic rights of the individual? Safety and civil liberty are completely separate issues and the concept of economic rights starts to push the boundaries of accepted norms. The basic tenant of market economies is that individuals have a right to make a profit, but there are no limits on the degree of profit maximizing. If there is no ceiling to profit, by equality, there should be no floor or minimum threshold of profit that an individual should expect.
Based on Pigou, it is possible to extend the concept of negative externalities to the individual level, so that even if one person is adversely affected by something, it can be said to create the potential for an economic loss to that individual. The potential of this situation can be construed as not being a Pareto improvement. Situations are said to be a Pareto improvement where at least one person is made "better off" without making another person "worse off."166 Based on the combined theory of Pigou and Pareto, GM-crop commercialization that adversely affects non-adopters would establish that nonadopters have been made "worse off" because of the negative externalities of lost premiums and increased costs.
The Kaldor-Hicks criteria, however, can address this situation.167 In an attempt to propose a means of allowing innovation that would result in the non-adopters not being made worse off, Kaldor and Hicks proposed an improvement that would be Pareto efficient, provided two criteria were followed. The Kaldor-Hicks criteria holds that: first, if the "winners" of an innovation are able to compensate the "losers" then the innovation is a Pareto improvement; and second, if the "losers" are unable to bribe the "winners" to prevent the commercialization of the innovation it is also an improvement.168 The first criterion could be a tax of some type that is less than the level of benefits from adopting the innovation. Assuming the tax is lower than the net benefit, there would be an improvement for the adopters, albeit at a lower level. The pool of revenue from the adoption tax would theoretically be used to provide compen-sation to those non-adopters that have been adversely effected.169 Provided the compensation is at least equal to the losses suffered by the non-adopter, they are, in terms of Pareto efficiency, no worse off. The first criterion only partially holds as the global biotechnology industry has developed "the Compact," a liability compensation mechanism for biodiversity damage. 170 No compensation for non-adopter economic loss is provided for in the Compact.
The latter criterion holds because the number of non-adopters is not large and the ability of nonadopters to bribe the multinational seed development firms is virtually nonexistent. If nonadopters were in a situation to be able to bribe the commercializers of innovation, this would not be Pareto efficient as the benefits of the innovation would not be realized, and hence the GM adopters and developers would be made worse off. Hypothetically, the firm doing the commercialization could be compensated for their costs, but the lost future profits would not be accounted for, nor any of the increased profits that the GM adopters would expect. With the loss of the innovative technology, potential GM adopters would be worse off. Removing the ability to bribe GM developers or GM adopters, or both keeps the Kaldor-Hicks criteria as Pareto efficient.
If an economic loss compensation scheme for non-adopters of GM crops were to be established, it would ultimately be undertaken by a federal government. Denmark has established such a compensation scheme. 171 The redistribution of wealth has taxed many a society and government.
The variety of wealth redistribution programs and mechanisms are diverse and according to Alston and his coauthors, many economists assumed that the cost of wealth redistribution, regardless of the economic sector, was equal to the revenue that was redirected.172 These original assumptions held that the redistribution of money by government was costless. This is obviously not the case and research provides estimates on the marginal social welfare cost that range from $1.20 to $1.50 for every dollar distributed.173 In a review of this literature, Fullerton reconciled the results and suggests that the marginal cost of taxation (in the United States) is considerably lower than first thought, ranging from $1.07 to $1.25.174 In essence, for every $1 of government revenue that is redistributed, it will cost between 7 and 25 percent to do this, thus reducing the amount of revenue that is available to be redistributed.
While the cost of redistribution of monies is an important one, it is not the main concern.
Compensation schemes that are mandated by government, regardless of who funds them, do not address the problem. The allocation of compensation to non-adopters does not get at the heart of the claims of harm by non-adopters even when there has been no comingling; it will not end the challenge of pure economic loss. This is especially the case if funds from general government revenue are used to fund the compensation scheme as opposed to making certain that tax revenue from a Pigovian form of tax are used. The involvement of government in addressing the negative externality ultimately means that the externality will increase over time as the rate of adoption increases. By relying on the courts to respond to non-adopters' rights, society is leaving it to the courts to decide whether the choice not to adopt or be affected by GMOs is a legal right, the interference with which should be compensated. If courts in a particular country decide there is no duty of care, they are effectively deciding that there is no legal right to not be affected by a new technology.
While this accords with past practices in the case of claims of harm based simply on new competition, it is new ground where claims of lost opportunity to farm, or increased costs of farming, without an innovation are concerned. If the court decides there can be a legal duty, that does not necessarily answer the question of whether GM agriculture is undesirable or whether protection and compensation should be provided to non-adopters because the remainder of the ingredients (such as lack of reasonable care and causation of actual damage) to succeed in negligence still must be present. But it means it is foreseeable that harm could be caused if reasonable care is not taken to avoid it and lack of clarity about what that care requires may block or hinder the introduction of a worthwhile innovation.
It is not in the best interests of non-adopters, GM adopters, developers, or society that the courts in effect determine the type of agriculture farmers can pursue and whether an innovation is adopted. First, as shown in this article, leaving the issue to the courts creates considerable uncertainty. Such uncertainty is undesirable if GMO innovation is to be encouraged. Secondly, private actions between two parties are not the appropriate forum in which to determine whether the social and economic impacts of GMO releases are such that GMO commercialization should or should not proceed. The economic interests of the whole society must be adequately weighed in any balancing process. As suggested by Ogus and Richardson in relation to other matters, courts are likely to find that "the principle of justice which postulates that existing property rights must be protected even where the result will impose greater costs on society at large" requires decisions in favor of non-adopters. 176 Further, in many cases the courts will be able to consider the matter only after harm of some sort has occurred. Thirdly, such matters are complex in terms of the policy decisions that must be made.177 Policy on the matter should (and probably can only) be determined by government in light of society's best interests, not those of the parties before a court.
It is also possible that as between the United States, Canada, and Australia, the courts will answer the duty question differently. In considering a range of legal concerns to decide whether there is a duty, this decision presumably reflects the views and attitudes of that country's society regarding those concerns. Those attitudes may show whether the particular society has an innovator or traditional technology bias-particularly their willingness to describe something as a "worthy harm"
that will be compensated through the courts or whether, as evidenced by a finding by their courts of no duty of care for policy reasons, the preference is for the innovator. However, it must also be remembered that different common law jurisdictions take a different attitude toward claims for pure economic loss generally and that if it is argued that there is nothing special about GM technology compared to any other innovative technology, it makes sense for the relevant courts to follow the precedents of that jurisdiction-such that there is often no duty for pure economic loss in the United States but may be in Australia and Canada.
The other aspect of non-adopters rights raises the question of if compensation is to be provided to non-adopters, who should provide it: The society getting the advantage of the innovative technology, the farmers who adopt GM, or the GM developer responsible for the particular GMO that caused the harm? In jurisdictions such as Denmark, where a revenue pool is used to compensate, society has decided that non-adopters should be compensated whether or not there is a right to be a non-adopter or a right not to be affected by new technology.178 In essence, they have created such a right and it is worth whatever the fund gives to them. The above analysis of the economic efficiencies of having such funds via government efforts shows this is inefficient. It is also inflexible and does not allow the individual circumstances of each case to be taken into account.
Where the GM adopter or developer is asked to provide the compensation, whether through providing the revenue pool as in Denmark, or pursuant to judgments by the courts, it must be asked whether it is appropriate that those acting in compliance with relevant regulations must pay wherever nonadopters suffer harm because of their own self-imposed standards. Two justifications could be suggested-because the "polluter should pay" and because GM developers are releasing Thresholds of this nature would allow many non-adopters to still be able to farm as they choose, without having to incorporate additional costs to avoid GM crops and to sell their produce into whatever market they desire without worry of rejection. Such agreements would also allow a political decision to be made regarding how to respond to the legal challenges raised by nonadopters balanced against the consequences of not allowing GM agriculture to proceed. Without agreements of this nature, it is conceivable that by the end of the coming decade the innovation of GM crops will simply be mired in a series of liability lawsuits.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2148830 21. A brief description of the types of losses that may be included in the term pure economic loss in the context of GM crops is given in pp. 8-9 above. However, it can be expected that there will be some differences between jurisdictions in the classification of harm in this context as property damage rather than pure economic loss. That issue is outside the scope of this paper but regarding the Australian position see Ludlow, Economic Impact, supra note 15, passim. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2148830
